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INSTA-APPROPRIATION:  FINDING BOUNDARIES 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S FAIR USE 
DOCTRINE AFTER CAMPBELL 
Anna Schuler* 
 
Copyright law’s current fair use landscape is riddled with unclear 
standards and old considerations forced upon new media.  This is 
especially problematic in the context of digital appropriation of art from 
online social media platforms—an issue highlighted by Richard Prince’s 
exhibit “New Portraits,” in which he appropriated strangers’ Instagram 
photos for his own profit.  Unless this situation is remedied, digital content 
creators will effectively lose their statutory copyright protections.  Thus, 
when considering digital appropriation cases, courts should require a 
transformation of content rather than purpose, should elevate the weight of 
the fourth statutory factor, and should reinstate the “comment upon” 
standard for works of parody and satire.  Other scholars have proposed 
changes to the fair use doctrine, but none adequately protect first-order 
digital content creators.  As such, this Note proposes a reinterpretation of 
the fair use factors in light of digital appropriation and social media. 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 368 
I.  THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION ....................... 370 
A.  Meeting the Threshold of Originality ....................................... 371 
B.  Fixation in the Digital Age ....................................................... 371 
C.  Making Fair Use of Copyrighted Works .................................. 372 
1.  The Four Factors of Fair Use ............................................. 373 
2.  Fair Use in Nondigital Art:  The Second Circuit’s 
Leading Approach ............................................................. 375 
a.  Initial Treatment of Fair Use ....................................... 375 
b.  Post-Campbell Fair Use in the Second Circuit ............ 376 
II.  THE SPECULATIVE FUTURE OF FAIR USE IN THE DIGITAL AGE .......... 378 
A.  The Status Quo:  The Second Circuit’s Application ................. 378 
1.  Recent Digital Cases .......................................................... 379 
2.  Status Quo Applied to Prince and Social Media ................ 380 
B.  Observations and Proposals for Reform .................................. 381 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2017; B.A. Barnard College, 2014.  
With special thanks to the guidance of my advisor, Professor Olivier Sylvain, and my family 
and friends for their constant support. 
368 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
C.  Proposing Fundamental Change to the Copyright System ....... 384 
1.  A Tax-Based Royalty Pooling System ............................... 384 
2.  A Fair Use Board ............................................................... 385 
3.  A Fair Use Arbitration System .......................................... 387 
4.  A Fair Use Agency ............................................................. 388 
a.  Model One:  The Office of Fair Use (TOFU) .............. 388 
b.  Model Two:  The Copyright Infringement Review 
Office (CIRO) ............................................................. 389 
III.  PROTECTING FIRST-ORDER DIGITAL CONTENT CREATORS:  
REFORMING THE FOUR-FACTOR ANALYSIS ................................... 391 
A.  Requiring a Transformation of Content .................................... 391 
B.  Reinstating the “Comment Upon” Standard for Parody and 
Satirical Uses .......................................................................... 392 
C.  Elevate the Weight of the Economic Effect for Digital 
Appropriation .......................................................................... 392 
D.  Additional Considerations ........................................................ 393 
E.  “New Portraits” Under the Amended Statutory Factors ......... 395 
F.  Critiques and Responses ........................................................... 396 
1.  Overruling Precedent:  Changing What Constitutes a 
Transformative Use ........................................................... 396 




Imagine getting a text that reads, “I just saw your portrait at Gagosian 
Gallery!”  As a young artist, this is your long-awaited dream.  But you then 
find out that your photograph, which you took and posted to your personal 
Instagram account, is being sold for thousands of dollars—and you will not 
receive a dime.  This was the scenario for several unsuspecting Instagram 
users when appropriation artist Richard Prince took their Instagram photos, 
commented on them, and then printed them on canvas to display and sell.1 
Prince did this without permission and without crediting the original 
posters.2  As The Guardian writes, “Prince’s New Portraits series comprises 
 
 1. Hannah J. Parkinson, Instagram, an Artist and the $100,000 Selfies—Appropriation 
in the Digital Age, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2015/jul/18/instagram-artist-richard-prince-selfies [https://perma.cc/27SA-Z652]. 
 2. Id.  Though there were several different categories of Instagram users from whom 
Prince copied, this Note focuses on the young artists.  “Apart from the smattering of 
celebrities, many of Prince’s subjects are aspiring or career-beginning models, actors, artists, 
students, in their teens and early-20s, working at clothing stores . . . or bars, while finding 
their feet.” Id.  In addition to appropriating posts from aspiring artists, Prince also 
appropriated posts containing the work of renowned photographer Donald Graham, who 
brought a copyright infringement suit against Prince. See Eileen Kinsella, Outraged 
Photographer Sues Gagosian Gallery and Richard Prince for Copyright Infringement, 
ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 4, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/donald-graham-sues-gagosian-
richard-prince-401498 [https://perma.cc/4XFS-SYLH]. 
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entirely of the Instagram photos of others.  The only element of alteration 
comes in the form of bizarre, esoteric, lewd, emoji-annotated comments 
made beneath the pictures by Prince.”3  In an age where young artists flock 
to social media platforms to display their work, society and the law should 
not sanction this type of blatant appropriation. 
Appropriation artists4 such as Jeff Koons and Richard Prince have long 
pushed the boundaries of copyright’s theory of fair use, and Prince’s most 
recent exhibit, entitled “New Portraits,” pushes these limits even further.  
Now, an artist named Donald Graham has sued Prince in federal court,5 and 
the Southern District of New York and potentially the Second Circuit will 
have to consider whether the appropriation art doctrine established in 
Cariou v. Prince,6 another case involving Prince’s work, will withstand the 
new considerations brought on by the ease of digital appropriation.  
Whether Prince’s most recent appropriation style is deemed “fair” will have 
a profound impact on how fine art interacts with social media and Internet 
postings in the fair use context.7  If the Southern District of New York or 
the Second Circuit does find fair use, it will have overarching implications 
for the exclusive rights that copyright owners hold in their works.  A 
primary inquiry of this Note will be whether current copyright standards of 
fair use and transformation promulgated by the Second Circuit are 
sufficient for the digital age.  This Note also will undergo an analysis of 
 
 3. Parkinson, supra note 1 (writing comments such as:  “ ” under a picture of 
partially exposed breasts; “Enjoyed the ride today, lets do it again. Richard.” under a picture 
of a woman looking back seductively at the camera in a car; and “Jez to be dare ID quite I’m 
you nut schmoo fwend ” under an image of a undressed woman). 
 4. Appropriation art is defined as “[t]he practice or technique of reworking the images 
or styles contained in earlier works of art, esp[ecially] (in later use) in order to provoke 
critical re-evaluation of well-known pieces by presenting them in new contexts, or to 
challenge notions of individual creativity or authenticity in art.” Emily Meyers, Art on Ice:  
The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 220 
(2007) (quoting Appropriation Art, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (Oct. 2001), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9877?redirectedFrom=appropriation#eid [https://perma.cc/ 
SD7X-GENG]). 
 5. See Kinsella, supra note 2. 
 6. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 7. Fair use is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement.  This judge-made doctrine 
was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976 § 107.  This section reads: 
  Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or 
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.  In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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how a fair use determination of Prince’s “New Portraits” likely would fare 
under both the current copyright regime and under proposals for reform. 
The Second Circuit has taken a leading role in fair use, art law, and novel 
legal issues brought on by the digital age.  It also has taken a leading role in 
cases that touch on all of these subjects.  However, it has yet to hear a case 
that combined art appropriation and fair use issues with digital and social 
media concerns.  How the Southern District and the Second Circuit rule on 
this issue will have a profound effect on the development of copyright law 
in the digital age. 
Part I reviews the elements and doctrines of copyright law that are 
relevant to digital media and appropriation art.  It explains that digital 
works posted to the Internet and on social media platforms most likely 
receive basic copyright protections—that is, they meet the basic 
requirements of creativity, fixation, and expression.  This part also 
considers the evolving doctrine of fair use, from a judge-created common 
law exception, to a codified defense against infringement, to the current 
expansive doctrine.  Then, this part will evaluate the impact of the Second 
Circuit’s holdings on the doctrine of fair use, tracing the changing 
application of appropriation art from Rogers v. Koons8 to Cariou. 
Part II considers a number of proposals to clarify and fix the current 
copyright regime.  Next, this part considers how Prince’s exhibit “New 
Portraits” likely would fare under the new considerations put forth in each 
proposal.  It then concludes that none of the considered proposals 
adequately address the impact of copyright and fair use considerations on 
first-order digital content creators, who often are young artists using social 
media platforms as a way to display and exhibit their work. 
Finally, Part III suggests alternative interpretations of the four statutory 
factors of fair use that would protect this subset of artists.  This part argues 
that (1) courts should require transformation of content; (2) the fourth 
factor, the effect on the potential market, should be given more weight; and 
(3) the “comment upon” standard should be reinstated for parody and 
satirical uses. 
I.  THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
The threshold of creativity required to receive copyright privileges is 
extremely low and copyright protection applies broadly.  However, in 
considering social media users’ and first-order9 digital content creators’ 
rights, it first should be established whether their works meet the 
requirements of originality and fixation needed for copyright protection.10 
 
 8. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 9. A first-order creator is the original creator of a work.  Second-order creators use the 
original work as the foundation for their own work.  The extent to which second-order 
creation is permissible is currently a major tension in copyright law—a tension that this Note 
aims to address. 
 10. This poses a major issue in the context of the copyrightability of social media 
postings.  While there is no word limit for protection, the 140-character limit for “tweets” on 
the Twitter platform might make most of the postings too short to meet the basic level of 
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A.  Meeting the Threshold of Originality 
Only “original works of authorship” can receive copyright protection 
under § 102(a) of the 2012 Copyright Act.11  Interestingly, nowhere in the 
copyright statute or in the Constitution is “originality” defined; yet it is 
central to the copyright regime.  As such, interpretation of this concept has 
developed over time.12 
Courts are hesitant to explicitly define the contours of the requisite 
creativity and originality required for copyright protection.  This reluctance 
forms the basis of the “nondiscrimination principal,” first articulated in 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.13  Because deciding the creativity 
of a work would necessarily turn on a subjective opinion regarding the 
value of such work, courts consistently have applied the creativity and 
originality standard liberally.14  Many social media posts indeed would 
meet this threshold requirement of originality; the more creative the post, 
the stronger the copyright protection is likely to be.15 
B.  Fixation in the Digital Age 
To receive copyright protection, a creative work must be fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression.16  Digital content clearly is “fixed” when it 
exists for “more than a transitory period” of time.17  Thus, all social media 
postings most likely would meet this requirement. 
 
creativity needed for copyright laws to apply. See Adam S. Nelson, Note, Tweet Me Fairly:  
Finding Attribution Rights Through Fair Use in the Twittersphere, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 697, 710 (2012).  For social media platforms like Instagram, some 
photos would qualify for protection while others may not. Id. 
 11. 17 U.S.C § 102(a). 
 12. It was once argued, for example, that photographs did not have the requisite 
creativity to qualify for copyright protections because they were simply “capturing reality.” 
See Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884) (holding that 
photographs could be considered “writings” and photographers were “authors” for purposes 
of the statute). 
 13. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).  There, the U.S. Supreme Court famously stated:  “It would be 
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final 
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious 
limits.” Id. at 251. 
 14. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that the 
alphabetization of listings in a telephone directory did not meet the requisite originality 
standard required to receive copyright protection).  There the Court stated that “[o]riginality 
does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other 
works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.” Id. at 345. 
 15. Postings of generic items such as pictures of food or monuments might not meet the 
threshold of creativity required for protection.  If they do, it is likely to be a “thin” 
protection.  When a work has thin protection, infringement is likely to be found only if the 
defendant copied all, or substantially all, of the plaintiff’s work. See CRAIG NARD ET AL., 
THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 494 (4th ed. 2014).  However, the Supreme Court has 
stated that photographs only need a modicum of creative composition to receive protections. 
See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 57. 
 16. See 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 17. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982).  
Additionally, “[a] court would likely find social media content to be fixed in tangible form.  
Therefore, for those works that also meet the originality requirement, this renders at least 
some user-generated content copyrightable material.” Jessica Gutierrez Alm, “Sharing” 
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Because an author’s rights exist upon fixation, registration with the 
government is not required to receive copyright protections.18  Copyright 
owners enjoy several exclusive rights, which include the right to make 
copies of the work and the right to publicly display the work.19  As 
American copyright law evolved, defenses to these exclusive copyright 
protections such as “fair use” were developed and codified.20 
C.  Making Fair Use of Copyrighted Works 
The concept of fair use is a judge-made doctrine with early roots in 
American jurisprudence.  One of the earliest fair use cases was Flosom v. 
Marsh,21 in which the defendant was sued for publishing copies of George 
Washington’s letters.22  In his famous decision, Justice Joseph Story 
explained several factors that courts should consider to determine if a 
secondary use is fair.  He stated: 
[T]he question of piracy, often depend[s] upon a nice balance of the 
comparative use made in one of the materials of the other; the nature, 
extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects of each work; and 
the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted 
to the same common sources of information, or to have exercise the same 
common diligence in the selection and arrangement of the materials.23 
These factors have since been the cornerstone of the fair use defense24 
and are meant to ensure that creativity will not stagnate due to the 
overrestriction of copyrights.25  Justice Story’s fair use factors were 
 
Copyrights:  The Copyright Implications of User Content in Social Media, 35 HAMLINE J. 
PUB. L. & POL’Y 104, 111 (2014). 
 18. However, registration does confer additional protections for copyright owners.  If 
seeking damages from copyright infringement, the plaintiff has the right to claim actual 
damages plus the infringer’s profits, or statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)–(c).  
However, statutory damages are only available for copyrights that are registered with the 
Copyright Office. Id.  In theory, authors still would be able to recover actual damages, but 
these are invariably harder to calculate and give the plaintiff less flexibility in litigation. See 
Engle v. Wild Oats, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 19. The other exclusive rights include the right to prepare derivative works, the right to 
distribute copies of the work, and the right to publicly perform the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 20. Id. § 107.  The doctrine of fair use was not part of the original copyright statute, 
either in its English form or in the Copyright Act of 1790.  Early copyright law recognized a 
“fair abridgement” claim, “by which a defendant could be found not to infringe by having 
demonstrated his own ‘invention, learning, and judgment’ in the production of a modified 
work.” NARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 697. 
 21. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
 22. Id. at 345. 
 23. Id. at 344. 
 24. The emergence of fair use to balance the benefit to the infringer against the harm to 
the copyright holder was explored in Justice Story’s formative opinion in Flosom, 9 F. Cas. 
at 344.  In that case, Justice Story articulated a framework for analysis that largely survives 
in § 107.  Fair use entered the law but remained uncodified until the 1976 Act formally 
included the doctrine.  Despite the early articulation of the fair use doctrine, the Supreme 
Court did not explicitly address fair use until 1984. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (“the Betamax case”). 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 107 codifies copyright’s fair use doctrine and provides that certain uses 
of copyrighted works are not infringements of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.  That a 
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codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, and courts now consider four 
nonexhaustive factors:  “(1) the purpose and character of the use . . . ; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work . . . ; and (4) the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”26 
1.  The Four Factors of Fair Use 
The preamble to the fair use section of the Copyright Act explains that, in 
general, fair use can be made of copyrighted materials for educational 
purposes such as, “criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”27  This nonexhaustive list is 
considered in conjunction with the four enumerated factors.  However, 
nothing in the text or history of the statute suggests how courts should 
handle any of the factors or how they should balance the results of 
analyzing each factor separately.28  In fact, the weight of certain factors has 
changed over time.  Formerly, courts afforded the fourth factor (effect on 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work) the most 
weight,29 but the Second Circuit has been influential in focusing on the first 
factor (the purpose and character of the work) by applying and expanding 
the “transformativeness” test.30 
In analyzing the purpose and character of the work, courts consider the 
transformative nature of the work and ask “whether the new work merely 
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the 
first with new expression, meaning, or message.”31  In Campbell v. Acuff-
 
use is “fair” is a defense to a charge of infringement, with the burdens of pleading and 
proving the defense falling on the alleged infringer. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See NARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 710.  However: 
[T]he first and fourth factors are overwhelmingly the most important factors in fair 
use analysis, as measured by their correlation with the outcome of the overall fair 
use test.  With regard to the first factor, . . . Beebe’s study reveals that 95% of the 
opinions that found that factor one disfavored fair use, found no fair use, while 
90% of opinions that found that factor one favored fair use, found fair use . . . for 
the fourth factor . . . the correlation with overall outcome was even higher.  Of 141 
opinions that found that factor four disfavored fair use, all but one found no fair 
use . . . a correlation of over 99%.  Of 116 opinions that found that factor four 
favored fair use, all but six found fair use:  a correlation of 95%. 
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 723–24 
(2011). 
 29. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) 
(stating that the fourth factor, the effect on the market for or value of the work, weighed 
most heavily against a finding of fair use). 
 30. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that Koons’s 
work sufficiently transformed Blanch’s photograph because it incorporated her work into a 
larger social commentary). 
 31. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Flosom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1841)); accord Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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Rose Music, Inc.,32 arguably the most important modern fair use case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court liberalized the traditional fair use standard by adopting 
Judge Pierre N. Leval’s definition of transformation.33  As Professor 
Pamela Samuelson stated, the most notable contributions of the Campbell 
decision have been “the Court’s emphasis on the ‘transformative’ nature of 
a defendant’s use as weighing in favor of fair use, and . . . its expansive 
definition of what constitutes a ‘transformative’ use.”34 
The Court in Campbell based its transformation test on Judge Leval’s 
article “Toward a Fair Use Standard.”35  In this highly instrumental article, 
Judge Leval argued that the key determination in a fair use decision should 
be whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.36  He 
explained, “[t]he use must be productive and must employ the quoted 
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original.”37  
He articulates that if the secondary work “adds value” to the original, then it 
encompasses the very type of activity that fair use is meant to encourage in 
society.38  A court that accepts a use as transformative gives less weight to 
the possibility of market harm and the amount of the work taken, and the 
use will most likely be deemed fair.39  The concept of transformation is of 
central importance to appropriation art in general and has important 
ramifications for digital art posted on social media, as digital works are 
incredibly easy to manipulate and appropriate.  The interpretation of this 
factor is likely the most important for the fate of these works. 
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, analyzes the 
connection of the original work to copyright’s goals, such as the promotion 
of artistic expression.40  Works that are more factual in nature or employ 
common images are less likely to receive the same amount of protections as 
creative, individual works.41  For social media users, this second factor is 
relevant in determining the strength of a post’s copyright protection.  
Though most social media content would be deserving of at least minimal 
copyright protection, the strength of that protection likely would vary 
depending on the nature of the content. 
The amount and substantiality of the portion used, the third fair use 
factor, must be analyzed in terms of the “quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of the portion of the copyrighted material taken.”42  However, some courts 
consider this factor to be neutral, especially when analyzing works such as 
photographs where anything less than the entirety would be unrecognizable, 
 
 32. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 33. See id.  At the time of this decision, Judge Pierre N. Leval sat on the bench of the 
Southern District of New York.  He now sits on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 34. Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815, 818 
(2015). 
 35. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at 1111. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Netanel, supra note 28, at 723–24. 
 40. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 41. See NARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 494. 
 42. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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unlike quotations from books.43  In a social media context, most links and 
sharing platforms reproduce the entirety of a work.44  Thus, in the digital 
age, or at least regarding social media sharing platforms, this third factor 
might not be material to a fair use outcome. 
The final factor, the effect on the potential market for, or value of, the 
work, has been heralded as “undoubtedly the single most important element 
of fair use” (though never dispositive).45  It considers the market 
substitution effects of subsequent works on the market for the original.  In 
Campbell, however, the Court limited the emphasis on the fourth factor and 
held that the commercial purpose must be considered in context and should 
be given less weight when the use is transformative.46  If a use is 
sufficiently transformative, the Court explained, there will be a lower 
likelihood that such use will replace the market for the original.47  In light 
of “New Portraits,” and in consideration of social media users’ rights, this 
Note argues that in some situations, the market factor should, in fact, weigh 
heavily in the fair use decision. 
2.  Fair Use in Nondigital Art:  
The Second Circuit’s Leading Approach 
The Second Circuit’s approach to fair use for appropriation art has 
changed over the years.  In early appropriation art cases, the court guarded 
artists’ exclusive rights.  However, post-Campbell, the court went in the 
opposite direction, expanding the definition of what uses are considered 
fair, effectively minimizing original creators’ exclusive rights in their 
works. 
a.  Initial Treatment of Fair Use 
The Second Circuit’s fair use cases regarding nondigital art were the 
principal vehicles in creating the modern fair use landscape.  Several 
formative cases in the past few decades have both developed and greatly 
expanded the traditional conceptions of fair use.48  Notably, the Second 
Circuit has been instrumental in expanding fair use by using a liberal 
“transformation” test post-Campbell.49 
 
 43. See id. (“[C]opying the entirety of a work is sometimes necessary to make a fair use 
of the image.”). 
 44. For instance, on Twitter, a user can “retweet” the entirety of a posting, and on 
Pinterest, a user “pins” the entirety of an image.  On these platforms the sharing of an entire 
image or message is the foundation of the community and is an accepted practice when 
appropriate attribution is given. 
 45. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 46. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that, in a fair 
use analysis, a work’s transformative nature does not depend on whether it “comments” on 
the original work, but rather whether it has altered the original work with “new expression, 
meaning, or message”). 
 49. See id. 
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The Second Circuit initially adopted a protectionist view of copyright 
owners’ exclusive rights in Rogers v. Koons.50  There, appropriation artist 
Jeff Koons took a postcard with a picture of puppies on it and instructed his 
assistants to build a sculpture in the likeness of the image.51  When sued for 
infringement, Koons asserted a fair use defense, but the district court 
granted an injunction.52  On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the 
injunction, holding that Koons’s copying was so blatant that a trial was not 
required.53  In his defense, Koons suggested that the primary purpose of this 
piece was a social commentary meant to parody society at large.54  
However, the court rejected this contention, holding that to be considered 
parody, the new work needs to comment upon the underlying work, not be 
aimed at society at large.55  In the court’s four-factored analysis, the fourth 
factor was of material importance because Koons stood to gain financially 
from his appropriation of the postcard image, a consideration that weighed 
strongly against a finding of fair use.56 
b.  Post-Campbell Fair Use in the Second Circuit 
Koons continued to appropriate, and in Blanch v. Koons,57 the Second 
Circuit considered yet another challenge to his work.  However, this time 
the court employed a different theory and application of fair use.  Koons 
created a series of paintings entitled “Easyfun-Ethereal” for Deutsche Bank 
and the Guggenheim in 2000.58  In this series, he used a number of images 
from advertisements, which he combined with his own photographs.59  One 
of his pieces incorporated part of a photo by a well-known fashion 
photographer, Andrea Blanch.60  She filed suit for copyright infringement, 
and the district court once again decided on summary judgment.61  
However, this time, the court found that Koons’s use was transformative 
and therefore fair.62  On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the lower court’s 
finding of fair use and stressed the transformative nature of the work as 
material to the fair use analysis.63 
In Blanch, the Second Circuit deemed Koons’s work transformative 
because it was used as a commentary on the aesthetics of mass media.64  
 
 50. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 51. See id. at 305. 
 52. See id. at 306. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. at 310. 
 55. See id. at 311. 
 56. See id. at 312. 
 57. 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 58. See id. at 247. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. at 249. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. at 256. 
 64. See id. at 253.  However, in Campbell, the court did note that finding of 
transformativeness was not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, nor was 
transformativeness necessarily the only important fair use factor. Id. 
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The court articulated that when a copyrighted work is used as “raw 
material” for the creation of a new work with distinct “creative or 
communicative” intentions, then the use would be considered 
transformative in a fair use determination.65  This decision, in light of 
Campbell, arguably mirrored the Supreme Court’s adoption of the standard 
articulated in Judge Leval’s article.  However, it set a liberal precedent for 
what the Second Circuit would consider transformative in other 
appropriation art cases.  This is especially relevant in the digital age, where 
appropriation and manipulation of images is incredibly easy. 
This transformation standard was further expanded in the Second Circuit 
case Cariou v. Prince.66  This decision has been incredibly influential in 
modern fair use analyses, especially in appropriation art cases.67  In Cariou, 
the Second Circuit examined whether Richard Prince’s “Canal Zone Series” 
transformed Patrick Cariou’s photographs in such a way that made Prince’s 
use fair.68  Cariou’s original photographs were scenic shots of Rastafarians 
in natural island settings, printed in the book Yes Rasta.69  Prince ripped out 
book pages and superimposed Cariou’s photographs with images and 
colored “lozenges” layered on top of the original work.70  Prince juxtaposed 
the scenic images with images of musical instruments and created dystopian 
scenery throughout the “Canal Zone Series.” 
Some of the works were indeed more transformed than others, but most 
consisted of Prince’s use of Cariou’s entire photograph with few added 
elements.  The Second Circuit held that whether a work is transformative 
does not depend on whether it “comments” on the original work but rather 
whether it has altered the original work with “new expression, meaning, or 
message.”71  This was an important shift in fair use theory as the “comment 
upon” requirement was previously an important consideration for 
determining the nature of derivative works.72  Additionally, under 
Campbell’s influence, the Second Circuit ignored the negative effect 
Prince’s exhibit had on Cariou’s ability to display his own art for monetary 
gain.73  The court considered this factor unimportant because of the 
 
 65. See id. at 251–52. 
 66. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 67. See Samuelson, supra note 34, at 843. 
 68. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698. 
 69. See id. at 699. 
 70. See id. at 701.  The “lozenges” were oval-shaped blotches of color used sporadically 
throughout the pieces of the “Canal Zone Series.” 
 71. Id. at 705. 
 72. See id. 
 73. The district court case went into great detail regarding the effect of Prince’s work on 
Cariou’s market.  The Gagosian Gallery showed twenty-two of Prince’s paintings that 
featured Cariou’s photographs, created and sold an exhibition catalog, and sent invitation 
cards featuring pictures that included Cariou’s work. See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 
337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  The gallery ended up selling eight paintings for $10,480,000, of 
which Prince received 60 percent, or $6,288,000. Id. at 350.  Additionally, the gallery 
exchanged seven of the paintings for other art valued at between $6,000,000 and $8,000,000 
and made approximately $7,000 in exhibit paraphernalia. Id. at 351.  This is even more 
consequential because, at the same time, another gallery in New York was planning on 
showing Cariou’s photographs from Yes Rasta.  However, once the gallery owner found out 
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transformative nature of Prince’s work.  However, the Second Circuit went 
further than the Campbell Court, not only mitigating the importance of the 
fourth statutory factor, but also lowering the threshold for transformation by 
not requiring the secondary work to comment upon the original.74 
II.  THE SPECULATIVE FUTURE OF FAIR USE 
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
The rapid rise of the Internet and digital media has forced courts to apply 
dated legal standards to new contexts.  In an attempt to remedy the friction 
between new media and traditional copyright applications, courts have 
broadened what constitutes fair use.  However, in its expansion, the 
doctrine has become muddied and has ceased to adequately protect original 
content creators.  Additionally, as a result of the shifts in both the art world 
and intellectual property law, the level of appropriation of copyrighted 
material by both artists and nonartists has become “so pervasive that 
traditional copyright enforcement strategies [have] lost much of their 
utility.”75  As such, the future of fair use in the digital context has been a 
subject of much debate and has engendered wide and disparate suggestions, 
observations, and proposals from commentators and professors. 
Richard Prince’s exhibit “New Portraits” pushes the boundaries of fair 
use more.  This part will analyze the potential outcome of a copyright 
challenge to Prince’s appropriation under the current legal framework, as 
well as the exhibit’s fate under the proposals addressed below. 
A.  The Status Quo:  The Second Circuit’s Application 
As one of the most influential circuits in this area of law, the Second 
Circuit’s holdings reflect the leading application of the fair use and 
transformation tests as they stand in modern copyright jurisprudence.76  
Several recent Second Circuit cases have considered the fair use and 
transformation standards in digital contexts.77  In general, these cases 
fashioned liberal tests to determine whether a derivative work is considered 
a fair use and whether a subsequent work is sufficiently transformed for its 
use to be considered fair. 
 
about the Gagosian show, she cancelled Cariou’s show because it had been “done already.” 
Id. at 344.  At his show, Cariou had planned on selling copies of his books and prints of his 
photographs ranging from $3,000 to $20,000. Id. 
 74. Samuelson, supra note 34, at 830. 
 75. Richard H. Chused, The Legal Culture of Appropriation Art:  The Future of 
Copyright in the Remix Age, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 163, 166 (2014). 
 76. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 568 (2008); Netanel, supra note 28, at 721 (“First, Beebe 
found that, as measured by case citations, fair use opinions from courts of the Second and 
Ninth Circuits exerted an overwhelming influence on fair use opinions outside those 
Circuits, even more than we might expect.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
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1.  Recent Digital Cases 
In 2012, the Author’s Guild sued HathiTrust and several of its public 
university partners for copyright infringement.78  HathiTrust created a 
database of ten million books from digitized copies of research library 
collections and claimed its database made fair use of the copyrighted books 
because the full-text search feature allowed users to find books more 
easily.79  The Second Circuit agreed and characterized the full-text 
searchable database as “a quintessentially transformative use.”80  The court 
claimed that this use was for a different purpose than the authors had in 
mind when they wrote their books, which weighed in favor of finding the 
subsequent use fair.81  As Professor Samuelson noted, “the court viewed the 
full-text search use as transformative because it considered the HathiTrust 
database itself as a new work . . . .  [T]he court focused the harm analysis as 
to the transformative use on whether the use supplanted demand for the 
original, and if not, that factor tipped in favor of fairness.”82  In considering 
the searchable database a transformative work, the Second Circuit set the 
stage for other digital appropriation cases. 
The most recent fair use decision from the Second Circuit, Authors Guild 
v. Google, Inc.,83 once again considered the boundaries of fair use.  The 
plaintiffs, who owned copyrights in published books, sued Google for 
making digital copies of their books for its Google Library Project and 
Google Books Project.84  For these features, Google made digital copies of 
millions of books to create a publicly available search function that allows 
users to search for particular words or phrases in multiple books at once.85 
The court ultimately found that “Google’s making of a digital copy to 
provide a search function is a transformative use, which augments public 
knowledge by making available information about Plaintiffs’ books without 
providing the public with a substantial substitute for . . . the original works 
or derivatives of them.”86  This case is the most recent in the line of Second 
Circuit cases to expand the definition of fair use in response to changing 
Internet functions and considerations. 
 
 78. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 79. See HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id.  The court stated that “the full-text search function does not serve as a 
substitute for the books that are being searched.” Id. 
 82. Samuelson, supra note 34, at 836. 
 83. 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 84. See id. at 207. 
 85. See id.  The authors alleged infringement, while Google contended that the use was 
fair.  The district court agreed with the fair use assertion, to which the plaintiffs responded 
that the use was not “transformative” within the meaning of Campbell. 
 86. Id. 
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2.  Status Quo Applied to Prince and Social Media 
The Second Circuit has yet to apply its latest fair use standards to the 
growing field of social media and digital artistic appropriation.  When such 
expansive fair use standards are applied to social media uses, the results 
may undermine a digital creator’s exclusive copyright rights.  Recent events 
have highlighted this issue.  In his 2015 exhibit “New Portraits,” Richard 
Prince displayed large canvases on which he printed screenshots of others’ 
Instagram photos.87  As a matter of transformation, Prince commented on 
the original Instagram post before taking the image offline, so that his 
comment was displayed underneath the image along with the other top 
comments on the photo.88  He then sold the canvases in New York and 
London for an average of $100,000 each.89  Under the current test, his 
trivial transformation might pass the fair use standard.  His use is arguably 
for a different purpose than what the original posters conceived when 
posting their photos to Instagram, which has been enough to constitute fair 
use in other cases.90 
One of Prince’s canvases included a photo taken by world-renowned 
photographer Donald Graham.91  Subsequently, Graham sued Prince for 
copyright infringement.92  Now, a court will have to apply the Second 
Circuit’s expansive fair use test, designed for traditional art, to the world of 
digital and appropriation art.  As such, a key issue for the court will likely 
be the difference in transformation of content versus transformation of 
purpose in the new works. 
Many commentators have depicted the difference between content 
transformation and purpose transformation.93  Purpose transformation is 
likely to be deemed fair, as in the recent Second Circuit cases cited above.94  
In the case of “New Portraits,” there is arguably a transformation of 
purpose, if not of content.  Content transformation requires an alteration of 
the image itself.  The only added element to the images in “New Portraits” 
is the comment underneath the photo, which is likely not enough to qualify 
as sufficient content transformation.  However, Prince’s use could still be, 
and likely would be, considered fair use in light of his transformation of 
purpose and context.  Prince took the photos out of the social media context 
and put them into the gallery setting, while preserving the social media 
element of the Instagram border.  Shifting the audience for the work has 
been considered transformative and generally weighs in favor of a fair use 
 
 87. See Parkinson, supra note 1. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 91. See Kinsella, supra note 2. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 869 (2015); 
see also Netanel, supra note 28, at 746. 
 94. See, e.g., HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 445. 
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finding.95  In Cariou, the Second Circuit held that the audience for Cariou’s 
photographs was so different than Prince’s audience that his appropriation 
was unlikely to infringe on the market for the original work.96  Notably, 
whether the purpose or audience is truly transformed requires an underlying 
judicial determination of the purpose of the different works.97 
“New Portraits” also is unique because it is contrary to the traditional 
direction of appropriation.  Historically, copyrighted information has passed 
from the professional user to the amateur user.98  The amateur end user 
rarely would have the power or opportunity to infringe significantly on the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights.  However, with the rise of the Internet, 
infringement claims against end users became more common.99  Then, the 
phenomenon of peer-to-peer sharing arose, changing the distribution of 
content from amateur to amateur.  Now, with appropriation easier than ever, 
content can easily go from amateur to professional, as was the case in “New 
Portraits.”  However, the professional should not be able to exploit 
copyright in a manner that extinguishes the rights of these first-order digital 
content creators, a result the current system seems to sanction. 
B.  Observations and Proposals for Reform 
Many scholars lament the unpredictable nature of the current fair use 
system.  As such, proposals for reform are abundant.  Several of the most 
prominent suggestions include instituting a “fairness test” when considering 
user-generated content and amending the safe harbor provisions to declare 
some uses statutorily fair. 
In “The Tangled Web of UGC:  Making Copyright Sense of User-
Generated Content,” Daniel Gervais articulates the many ways copyright is 
struggling with user-generated content.100  One reason for this struggle is 
the massive amount of Internet users that are “downloading, altering, 
mixing, uploading, and/or making available audio, video, and text content 
on personal web pages, social sites, or using peer-to-peer technology to 
allow others to access content on their computer.”101  Current copyright 
doctrine, he argues, is not equipped to meet the changing requirements of 
the Internet age.102  Now, individual Internet users have become content 
providers, a sphere historically reserved for professionals.103  Because of 
 
 95. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 96. See id.  However, this requires that the court determine the audience of the work.  By 
determining the audience, the court is making a determination regarding the sophistication of 
the audience and thus potentially the value of the work itself, which may conflict with the 
nondiscrimination principal. 
 97. Which might, once again, force judges to make determinations regarding the quality 
and purpose of a work in potential violation of the nondiscrimination doctrine. 
 98. Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC:  Making Copyright Sense of User-
Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 846–47 (2009). 
 99. See id. at 847. 
 100. See id. at 841. 
 101. Id. at 845–46. 
 102. See id. at 855. 
 103. See id. at 849. 
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the changing intellectual property landscape, Gervais suggests that courts 
should recognize three categories of user-generated content:  user-authored 
content,104 user-derived content,105 and user-copied content.106  He then 
considers the potential copyright liabilities for each type of content. 
Gervais dismisses any liability for user-authored content by stating, “A 
fair use defense [for posting their work] should not be required, because 
where no previous copyrighted content is reused, there should be no finding 
of infringement.”107  This in itself is clear; the original creator of the 
content is also the poster of the content.  However, it is interesting that he 
does not consider the potential liabilities for people who infringe this user-
authored content. 
Gervais suggests that user-derived content poses the largest problem 
under the current fair use regime.108  He states that 
the fair use analysis applied to online derived content must include an 
adequate fairness test.  A distinction must be made between use value 
gained by the user and lost exchange value by the right holder.  The 
proper test is one of commercial exploitation . . . is the derivation  parasitic 
or simply free-riding?109 
He further suggests that most user-derived content is free riding and not 
parasitic, and thus, a court should consider this under the first and fourth 
statutory factors.110  This “fairness test” is meant to apply to amateur end 
users who Gervais suggests should only be liable for commercial 
exploitation of the copyrighted works.111  Interestingly, this test could be 
applied in the inverse—holding professional users liable when they exploit 
digital material from the amateur user for profit.  Under the current 
copyright regime, the fourth factor, the effect on the market, is not as 
important as it once was.  However, heightening this consideration for 
digital content is likely the fairest application of fair use standards to both 
everyday end users and professionals. 
Gervais argues that the production of user-copied content will be fair use 
if the user’s act of providing access to it is fair.112  Gervais suggests that the 
current transformation analysis should apply to user-copied content, and he 
argues for a clear distinction between transformation in expression and 
transformation of dissemination, the latter weighing against a finding of fair 
use.113 
 
 104. Content authored by the lay Internet, or “amateur” user. See id. at 858. 
 105. Content that the lay Internet user did not originally create but has used or has 
engaged with it in some way. See id. 
 106. Content copied by the lay Internet user.  This category would include sites like 
Tumblr and Pinterest that rely on the copying of entire posts. See id. at 859. 
 107. Id. at 865. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. at 867. 
 110. See id. at 867–68. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 861. 
 113. See id. at 863. 
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When the case of Prince’s “New Portraits” is considered under this 
regime, one must first make the leap that Gervais’s considerations can be 
applied in the inverse—that is, they can be applied to the professional 
appropriation artist and that they also can apply when digital content is 
taken offline and put in the traditional gallery setting.  Once that is assumed, 
the work then would be categorized.  The original Instagram posts, if they 
are indeed original to the poster, are obviously user-authored content. 
Categorizing Prince’s use of the work is more difficult.  Even though 
user-generated content is usually online, this analysis might still apply to 
Prince’s use because his actual art was a “screen shot” of an Instagram 
picture.  If he then had posted that image online, it would be considered 
user-derived or user-copied content within Gervais’s framework.  This 
Note’s analysis goes one step further and applies these categories even 
though the end result was displayed offline in a gallery, rather than staying 
purely digital.  The determination between user-derived content and user-
copied content most likely would turn on whether one considers Prince’s 
added comments underneath the Instagram photo sufficiently 
transformative.  A finding of transformation likely would lift Prince’s work 
from the user-copied category into the user-derived category.  As such, both 
categories will be considered. 
If Prince’s work is considered user-derived content,114 then Gervais’s 
system requires that the “adequate fairness test” apply.  In this analysis, a 
court would consider the commercialization of the secondary work.  In 
Gervais’s words, the primary inquiry should be, “is the derivation parasitic 
or simply free-riding?”115  Because this is a test of commerciality, a court 
would take into account that Prince sold his works for large sums of money.  
Thus, under this category, the nature of his exhibit most likely would fall 
into the parasitic category, weighing against a finding of fair use. 
If one does not consider the comments under the original Instagram posts 
to be transformative, then Prince’s work would fall into the user-copied 
category.  In this analysis, Gervais states that there will be a fair use defense 
if “the user’s act of providing access to [the work] is fair.”116  Here, the 
images were not part of a public-domain-type archive, but rather were taken 
from the private accounts of everyday Instagram users.  For user-copied 
content, Gervais suggests that the current transformation analysis should 
apply. 
Gervais argues that there should be a clear distinction between 
transformation in expression and transformation of dissemination.117  If one 
puts forth that Prince’s work is user-copied content and that the level of 
transformation is too minimal to be considered a fair use, Prince’s work 
would be more accurately categorized as “transformation of dissemination” 
rather than of expression.  He simply changed the forum of the original 
 
 114. In this scenario, Prince would be the “user” of the content derived from the original 
Instagram posters. 
 115. Gervais, supra note 98, at 867. 
 116. Id. at 862. 
 117. Id. 
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Instagram images, a transformation that Gervais argues is not enough to 
save a derivative work from an infringement claim.  Thus, under this 
system, whether Prince’s work is considered user-copied or user-derived, 
his use would likely not be considered fair.  However, this analysis does 
require Gervais’s categories to apply to the professional end user who takes 
the content offline and into the traditional art world, a situation left 
undiscussed in his proposal. 
C.  Proposing Fundamental Change 
to the Copyright System 
Several professors and commentators see the current fair use system as so 
fundamentally flawed that it needs to be reconceptualized in its entirety.  
The primary contention is that ascertaining the scope of fair use ex ante is 
so uncertain that the doctrine is not functioning effectively for either party.  
One plan looks to restructure payment incentives, and many others look to 
restructure the system either within the Copyright Office or through the use 
of new administrative procedures. 
1.  A Tax-Based Royalty Pooling System 
Professor Richard Chused argues that because of a shift in both 
intellectual property law and art culture in the last century, “the level of 
reuse and remixing of protected material, both by artists and 
nonartists . . . became so pervasive that traditional copyright enforcement 
strategies lost much of their utility.”118  To remedy this, Chused argues that 
copyright law must be reconstructed in its entirety to protect copyright 
owners without the need for litigation.  He suggests that instead of 
regulating digital appropriation, artists should be able to opt into a different 
system of payment—one that keeps traditional payment incentives without 
fighting copying and appropriation.119 
He puts forth a system that taxes electronic and other digital equipment 
and pools the funds for redistribution.120  Artists, whose works are online, 
with or without their consent, will have the option to forgo traditional 
judicial remedies and join an artist group that redistributes the pooled funds 
based on usage.121  While he does address the ramifications for 
appropriation artists, the results under this system would be less than ideal 
for first-order digital content creators.  He states: 
The result for art appropriators and other remixers would be both useful 
and interesting.  Their payment for the digital equipment they use would 
include a “tax”—in essence a fee allowing them to access and use 
 
 118. Chused, supra note 75, at 166. 
 119. See id. at 167. 
 120. See id. at 192. 
 121. Organizations seeking to obtain and distribute part of any royalty pool should be 
required to apply to the Copyright Office for approval to participate in the system.  “Each 
participating royalty pooling organization should be given the freedom to develop its own 
monitoring methods and royalty allocation procedures.” See id. at 199.  Authors and 
copyright owners, in turn, would then be free to select which organization to join. 
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copyrighted material after they have been digitized and placed online 
outside the control of copyright owners.  Once they pay these fees, 
nothing would need to be done.  Much like a recording arts making a 
cover, they could do as they wished with online digital materials subject 
only to moral right limitations or other non-copyright based control 
systems.122 
He goes further, arguing that fair use would be “frictionless” under this 
system because any potential fair user would have paid their tax and thus 
have nearly unrestricted access to the work.123  Any difficulty with this 
system, he posits, only arises with respect to copyrighted items not 
embedded in the royalty pooling system.124  However, this is the very group 
of people and artists this Note addresses, those least likely to be part of any 
formalized system, yet whose works still deserve copyright protections. 
Under Chused’s system, an artist like Prince would be able to make fair 
use of any content that is digitized and put outside the control of the 
copyright owners.  However, Chused does not consider this system’s 
impact on first-order digital content creators whose first “publication” is 
digital.  His analysis arguably works for traditional artists who have 
digitized physical pieces they have created.  But once again, the amateur or 
young artists working outside this system would be left unprotected. 
In the case of “New Portraits,” the original Instagram users most likely 
would not have been registered in any royalty-pooling scheme.  Thus, 
Chused falls back on traditional copyright doctrine to cover those who opt 
out of the pooling system.125  Once again, this puts Prince’s use under the 
current judicial analysis that does not protect the subset of artists from 
whom he appropriated. 
2.  A Fair Use Board 
In an administrative-based reform, Michael Carroll suggests that 
Congress amend the Copyright Act to create a “Fair Use Board” within the 
Copyright Office with the power to declare whether the use of a certain 
copyrighted material is fair.126  A declaration from the Fair Use Board 
would act similarly to a private letter ruling from the IRS or a no-action 
letter for the SEC.  That is, a favorable opinion from the Fair Use Board 
would immunize the petitioner from copyright liability for the proposed 
use, subject to judicial review.127 
Among others, Carroll believes that current copyright law is unable to 
supply copyright owners with the necessary means to enforce their rights 
while ensuring sufficient freedom to end users.128  With this proposal, 
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Carroll aims to overcome fair use uncertainty by reducing the costs of 
obtaining a fair use determination ex ante.  Specifically, he states: 
Congress should extend the advisory opinion function  available in other 
bodies of federal law to copyright law by amending the Copyright Act to 
create a Fair Use Board  in the U.S. Copyright Office. Fair use judges 
would have the authority and the obligation to consider petitions for a fair 
use ruling on a contemplated or actual use of a copyrighted work.129 
Carroll describes the Fair Use Board as an equivalent to the recently created 
Copyright Royalty Board.130  As is the case with copyright royalty judges, 
the Librarian of Congress would appoint members of the Fair Use Board.131  
Under this system, a copyright owner would receive notification of the 
submitted petition for fair use and would have the option to participate in 
the proceeding.132 
Any determination by the Fair Use Board would be subject to 
administrative review by the Register of Copyrights.133  Additionally, any 
decision out of this process would be subject to judicial review in any 
federal circuit court of appeals.134  Carroll makes clear that the power to 
make generally binding interpretations of the law would remain with the 
federal courts, and the Fair Use Board would be required to apply judicial 
fair use precedent to the extent possible.135  This proposal, while providing 
a new structural system, does not attempt to address the underlying 
problem—the fact that the current framework of copyright and fair use 
itself provides an insufficient model to address modern fair use inquiries.  
Simply providing an alternative forum will not ameliorate the issue of 
muddy standards that is currently present in the fair use doctrine. 
Additionally, Carroll’s proposal first requires that an artist or would-be 
user decide to bring a case before the Fair Use Board.  Put bluntly—this 
system requires that an artist care, or worry, about his potentially 
inappropriate use.  Artists like Prince, who have had success in court based 
on their fair use defenses, are unlikely to take the time, effort, and costs to 
get an ex ante judgment regarding use of another’s work.  For “New 
Portraits,” Prince did not ask for permission to use the Instagram posts.  
This, combined with other instances of his blatant appropriation, make it 
seem unlikely that artists like Prince would come to the Fair Use Board for 
judgment. 
Fellow fair use reformer Professor Jason Mazzone questions Carroll’s 
approach because it provides certainty only to the individual user.136  
 
 129. See id. at 1123. 
 130. “The Copyright Royalty Board is the institutional entity in the Library of Congress 
that will house the Copyright Royalty Judges, appointed pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 801(a), and 
their staff.” THE FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/copyright-
royalty-board (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9ZWE-QLE2]. 
 131. See Carroll, supra note 126, at 1124. 
 132. See id. at 1190. 
 133. See id. at 1123. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 1128. 
 136. Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 431 (2009). 
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Because the decisions would be made on a case-by-case basis, there is 
certainty only with respect to the particular use that is on review.137  This 
fails to give other users any indication that their use is fair, and “certainty 
on a large scale is therefore impossible.”138  Because the Fair Use Board 
would not have the authority to create clear guidelines or rules, and it is 
obligated to apply precedent, this proposal would not solve the current 
system’s failure to adequately address digital media and modern forms of 
appropriation.  Carroll’s proposal does not address the uncertainty of the 
current doctrine and thus likely would not handle the rights of first-order 
digital content creators any differently than the current regime. 
3.  A Fair Use Arbitration System 
David Nimmer suggests an arbitration system to resolve any disputes of 
fair use.  Under this system, the Register of Copyrights would identify a list 
of qualified arbiters, and users who are unable to negotiate license 
agreements would be permitted to institute an arbitration proceeding.139  
Professor Nimmer describes the process as an “expedited, voluntary, 
inexpensive, non-binding procedure to obtain an impartial indication as to 
fair use that would be a valuable adjunct to our copyright laws, offering 
guidance to prospective plaintiffs and defendants alike.”140 
The proposal contemplates that regardless of the fair use rulings at 
arbitration, any subsequent review in a court of proper jurisdiction will 
proceed ab initio.  And in fact, “the court shall not be obligated to accord 
any weight to the ruling of the Fair Use Arbiter(s).”141  If the usage is 
deemed not fair, that ruling is admissible in the context of determining the 
defendant/petitioner’s willfulness.142  Additionally, if the Fair Use Arbiters 
rule in favor of fair use, then the available remedies would be limited to 
actual damages and profits.143 
However, this system is flawed in its assumption that parties would first 
attempt a licensing agreement.  As stated above, this likely should not be 
assumed for modern appropriation artists like Prince.  Similarly, the 
everyday copyright user would probably not have the sophistication to 
attempt a licensing agreement.  In considering “New Portraits” under this 
system, because Prince did not attempt to negotiate with the original artists, 
and because most of the Instagram users did not know their work was 
appropriated, it is likely that if litigation ensued it would proceed straight to 
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court, which would then apply the current standards.  Even if parties were 
to use the Fair Use Arbitration system, judges would not be obligated to put 
any weight on the decision, further mitigating any real change to the 
copyright system under this proposal. 
4.  A Fair Use Agency 
In a complete overhaul of the current fair use system, Jason Mazzone 
suggests the creation of a fair use administrative agency to regulate 
permissible uses.  He argues that this would be the most comprehensive 
way for the system to adapt to modern uses and eradicate uncertainty 
regarding fair use.144  Mazzone posits that, in most areas of the law where 
clear directives are needed to guide behavior but where Congress and the 
courts are unable to supply clarity, our system turns to administrative 
agencies.145  The nature of judicial decisions, he argues, fails to provide 
general guidance about when a proposed use is fair, making future 
determinations difficult.146  In each case, the judge is asked to resolve 
whether (1) a particular copying of (2) a specified amount of (3) a given 
work for (4) a certain purpose falls within the protections of fair use.  This 
is an incredibly specific consideration that does not provide the general 
public with a clear understanding of the fair use doctrine. 
Mazzone argues that part of this confusion stems from the fact that the 
provisions of § 107 of the Copyright Act are standards, rather than rules.147  
In a modern administrative state such as ours, agencies can provide 
important legal directives with much more clarity.  This is especially 
pressing considering that, with the rise of the Internet, intellectual property 
laws affect a vast number of individuals and entities, and the law is 
increasingly complex.  To remedy this situation he proposes two variations 
of an administrative agency that could help mitigate the current system’s 
uncertainty:  the Office of Fair Use (TOFU) and the Copyright Infringement 
Review Office (CIRO).148 
a.  Model One:  The Office of Fair Use (TOFU) 
Under this model, Congress would do three things:  First, Congress 
would make it unlawful to interfere with fair uses of copyrighted works and 
subject offenders to civil penalties.149  This prong would target certain 
market players who routinely try to restrict fair uses of their copyrighted 
works.150  This approach would be similar to federal consumer protection 
laws, as a federal fair use protection statute would protect the public from 
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false claims and other practices that limit fair use.151  Second, Congress 
would create an agency whose primary role would be to enforce this 
statute.152  It would enforce the statute through traditional rulemaking and 
adjudication and would operate under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).153  Third, Congress would specify that fair use law, including the 
agency regulations, would preempt state laws of contract that would 
potentially limit fair uses of copyrighted works.154 
In this scenario, rules would proceed under notice and comment under 
the APA, allowing for the public and interested parties to take part in 
reformation of the system.155  Additionally, as with other administrative 
adjudications, agency decisions would be reviewable in the U.S. courts of 
appeals and would receive deference from the courts.156 
This model of reform would include a huge monetary and social 
investment by the public.  However, in the current government system 
where administrative offices flourish, an office such as TOFU would likely 
be the most consistent and fair way to determine rules for an area of law 
that is constantly changing. 
b.  Model Two:  The Copyright Infringement Review Office (CIRO) 
In his second agency proposal, Mazzone suggests that Congress give a 
federal agency similar to TOFU more general responsibility in copyright 
infringement claims.157  The agency still would have the power to issue 
regulations defining fair use, but an agency such as CIRO also would have 
adjudicative authority under this scheme.158  Here, a copyright owner 
alleging infringement would be required to file, prior to going to court, a 
complaint with the office, which would in turn conduct an investigation into 
the fair use claim under its current regulations if a fair use defense is 
asserted.159  The office would issue a decision in a notice, then the 
copyright owner could file a suit if he so desired.160  Further, if CIRO 
concluded that there was no fair use defense available and therefore the use 
likely is an infringement, it could attempt a settlement through an office 
proceeding.161  Once again, in deciding the copyright infringement action, 
courts would defer to the agency’s decisions as to whether the use at issue 
was fair.162 
Other scholars have considered and critiqued the administrative 
approach.  In “Beyond Fair Use,” Gideon Parchomovsky and Philip J. 
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Weiser state that “[b]oth Carroll’s and Mazzone’s proposals raise several 
concerns.”163  Specifically, Parchomovsky and Weiser are concerned with 
two costs associated with their proposals:  “First, there is the fixed cost of 
setting up [a] review body—be it a board within the copyright office or an 
independent administrative organization.  Second, there is the cost of the 
actual review.”164  Parchomovsky and Weiser worry that review requests 
would overwhelm any administrative body, creating problems much like 
those that plague the Patent and Trademark Office today.165 
Parchomovsky and Weiser also critique Mazzone’s first agency model, 
TOFU, stating that the content and basis for drafting the regulations is 
unclear.166  They claim that the case law in this area does not provide a 
clear body of law on which to base any comprehensive regulation.167  
Fundamentally, they argue that the prevailing disagreement as to the 
meaning and boundaries of fair use does not bode well for Mazzone’s 
proposal.168  However, Parchomovsky and Weiser seem to ignore that the 
muddiness of fair use guidelines is what this agency means to correct.  
While there may not be a clear body of law or judicial agreement, that is 
potentially a reason for the complete overhaul of the copyright system 
through an administrative agency. 
Mazzone’s CIRO, in conjunction with the proposed agency in model one, 
would offer all ranges of end users the form and forum through which to 
pursue their claims.169  Additionally, with clear regulations and published 
rules there would be potentially fewer cases of uncertainty requiring 
litigation.  This system would provide an appropriate forum for all types of 
copyrightable materials, those seen and unforeseen. 
Without the formalized rules and regulations of the proposed agency, it is 
very difficult to predict how “New Portraits” would fare under the proposed 
system.  As such, this Note forgoes that analysis.  However, because the 
public would be involved in the proposed agency rules, there is less concern 
that certain interests would go unaddressed or that some parties would be 
unprotected.170  In fact, because an agency can tailor rules to specific 
instances, there could be a rule specifically for appropriation art in the 
digital context.  Though implementing such a proposal would require an 
extensive overhaul of the current system, it could be the solution fair use 
needs. 
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III.  PROTECTING FIRST-ORDER DIGITAL CONTENT CREATORS:  
REFORMING THE FOUR-FACTOR ANALYSIS 
To protect end users from infringement liability, commentators have 
failed to address the practical consideration that young artists of all kinds 
flock to social media to publicly display their art and hopefully gain 
attention and notoriety.  To shield creative end users from excessive 
copyright infringement liability, the rights of first-order creators of digital 
content are left out of consideration.  Often dismissed as amateurs, Internet 
content creators are indeed copyright owners who enjoy the benefit of 
exclusive statutory rights.  However, commentators have generally 
overlooked potential violations of these rights. 
As such, this Note proposes an altered interpretation of the first and 
fourth fair use factors, along with additional considerations that courts 
should analyze in digital appropriation cases. 
A.  Requiring a Transformation of Content 
In a standard fair use case assuming that (1) the appropriated material is 
original, fixed, and constitutes expression rather than ideas and (2) a 
defendant violated an exclusive right, a court examines the four statutory 
factors of fair use.171  The first factor has seen the most change in 
application since the factors were codified in 1976.172  In analyzing the first 
factor, the purpose and content of the work, courts have held that when the 
original work is sufficiently “transformed” its use generally will be fair.173  
However, this Note proposes that instead of permitting transformation of 
setting, context, and purpose of the work to constitute fair use, the inquiry 
should focus primarily on transformation of content. 
A focus on transformation of content will put this first factor back in 
alignment with the original utilitarian incentives of exclusive copyright 
protection.174  A true transformation of the original work should weigh in 
favor of a finding of fair use.  This standard allows appropriation artists to 
work with copyrighted materials while providing stronger protections for 
the original creators.  This would protect artists like the Instagram users 
whose work was used in “New Portraits” from having their work taken off 
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the Internet and placed in galleries.  This would additionally protect artists 
such as Patrick Cariou whose work was taken from print media and put into 
the fine arts setting with little transformation of content.175 
B.  Reinstating the “Comment Upon” Standard 
for Parody and Satirical Uses 
In determining whether satire and parody uses are transformative, courts 
should reinstate the “comment upon” standard that the Second Circuit has 
largely eliminated.176  This standard provides a safeguard both for the 
would-be critic and the original content creator.  A content creator is less 
likely to license work for the use of satire and parody.  But, this standard 
still allows critics to make fair use of copyrighted works for social 
commentary.  Reinstating the “comment upon” standard would give some 
control back to the copyright owner while permitting productive social 
dialogue. 
C.  Elevate the Weight of the Economic Effect 
for Digital Appropriation 
This Note proposes that courts should give more consideration to the 
fourth fair use factor.  As it stands now, this factor, which considers the 
effect on the potential market or value of the original work, is not given 
much weight in the fair use analysis.177  However, with digital 
appropriation being incredibly easy, the market factor should once again be 
a primary consideration in whether a use is fair. 
The Campbell court mitigated the importance of the market factor partly 
because the case dealt with a parody use.178  With parody and satire, there is 
a lesser chance of the secondary work interfering with the market for the 
original.179  This also is likely to be the case where less than the entirety of 
a work is used, as in Blanch.180  However, where the entirety of the original 
work is used and there is no underlying social commentary, the effect on 
the market for the original work should be a material consideration. 
Even when this factor is elevated, there is still a potential issue in the 
judicial determination of what the “market” or “audience” is for each work.  
By determining the audience, the court is making a determination regarding 
the sophistication of the audience and thus potentially the value of the work 
itself.  In Cariou, for example, the Second Circuit determined that the 
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audiences and markets for the two artists were so vastly different that one 
would have little effect on the other.181  However, if the audience had been 
deemed broader, say, “buyers of artistic works,” then both Cariou and 
Prince’s audiences would be the same.  Allowing the judiciary to make a 
determination of the audience potentially implicates the nondiscrimination 
principle.182  Indeed, “disputes between appropriation artists and the 
creators or owners of a work appropriated by them . . . may provoke courts 
to make aesthetic determinations about the works involved under the 
copyright fair use doctrine.”183  As such, the “market” and “audience” for 
works should be construed broadly as to avoid an imposition of judicial 
opinion. 
D.  Additional Considerations 
In addition to the four statutory factors, courts should consider the type of 
appropriation at issue in each case.  They should consider whether the 
appropriation is from professional to amateur, peer to peer, or whether it is 
from amateur to professional.  In professional-to-amateur situations, a court 
should apply a test similar to Gervais’s fairness test.184  It should look to 
whether the purpose is sharing, whether it is free riding, or whether it is 
more nefarious and “parasitic.”  A categorization of parasitic use should 
weigh most heavily against a finding of fair use, while a finding that the use 
is used merely in sharing or education should weigh in favor of fair use. 
In cases of amateur-to-professional use, there should be a higher standard 
of what constitutes fair use.  Otherwise, young artists and content creators 
can have their work appropriated for the gain of the professional artist.  
Their original work should be protected, even when it is on a digital 
platform.  Thus, in this category, the market factor should be weighed most 
heavily.  In each category of appropriation, the court should still apply the 
four amended statutory factors in their determination of fair use. 
Historically, the distinction between amateur and professional was an 
uncomplicated determination.185  Primarily, copyrights were given only to 
professional users, and claims of infringement rarely were brought against 
the amateur, or private user.186  Private and amateur uses coincided, as did 
professional and public uses.187  Now, amateur uses are increasingly public, 
making infringement of this content very easy.188  Because copyright’s 
exclusive rights exist without reference to these traditional distinctions, this 
both has increased the infringement claims brought against private end 
 
 181. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 182. See supra Part I.A. 
 183. Christine Farley, No Comment:  Will Cariou v. Prince Alter Copyright Judges’ Taste 
in Art?, 5 IP THEORY 1, 20 (2015);  see also Mazzone, supra note 136, at 434 (“Although 
few would admit it (and fewer judges still), determinations of whether a use is fair reflects 
some degree of judgment about the value of the work.”). 
 184. See supra Part II.B. 
 185. See supra Part II.B. 
 186. See supra Part II.B. 
 187. See supra Part II.B. 
 188. See supra Part II.B. 
394 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
users and has increased the amount of copyrighted material that is available 
to the general public.189 
Protecting the amateur artist therefore has not been a necessary 
discussion in copyright law.  But, it is an important modern consideration.  
If copyright law is primarily utilitarian, which this Note argues it is, then 
the incentives of this group of artists is of material importance.  A 
professional artist should not be able to monetize the work of the amateur, 
for doing so could inhibit incentives for amateur artists to make and display 
their work.  Similarly, protecting the amateur would balance the power of 
dominant players such as Richard Prince, who rarely seek licensing 
agreements or permission for the works used, with the rights of amateur 
artists.  The equitable interests at stake are clear—amateur artists publish 
works online that are deserving of copyright and thus legal protection.  
Creating an analytic framework to uphold this interest will align with 
utilitarian theories of copyright. 
As of yet, no commentator has addressed the unique issue of first-order 
digital content creators and their rights within intellectual property law.  
While Gervais’s test correctly categorizes digital content users, he ignores 
the established rights those users have when they post original content.190  
As to the more intensive proposals, the primary flaw with both a Fair Use 
Board and an Arbitration system is that they provide clarity only to the 
individual user and for the individual use brought before review.191  In 
contrast, amending the interpretation of the current four statutory factors 
will simply alter the application of current doctrine, giving much more 
generalized clarity.  A royalty pooling system requires voluntary 
participation and thus is unlikely to gain widespread participation.192  This, 
in combination with the difficulty in pooling and distributing the royalties, 
makes this system unlikely to flourish.193 
Arguably, the creation of an entirely new administrative agency, 
empowered not only to determine fair uses ex ante but also with the power 
to resolve fair use disputes, would be the most comprehensive system of 
reform.  This would address the issue of public knowledge through notice 
and comment rulemaking and would be better able to address specialized 
groups and interests particular to fair use.  However, the enormous financial 
and social costs of such an endeavor make it unlikely to be adopted in the 
near future. 
By clarifying that “transformation” requires an actual change in content 
and not simply purpose and context, the public and appropriation art 
community are placed on notice that the court primarily will be considering 
the difference in content between the first and secondary use.  Additionally, 
focusing on the market effect will prevent commercial exploitation of 
digital work on social media.  Added emphasis on this factor is extremely 
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important in a society where appropriation is incredibly easy.  Finally, 
requiring a work of parody or satire to “comment upon” the underlying use 
will narrow the field of fair use while still providing social critics with a 
forum and means to engage with original copyrighted work. 
E.  “New Portraits” Under the Amended Statutory Factors 
When analyzed under the proposed amended interpretations, “New 
Portraits” would not be considered a fair use of the original copyrighted 
material.  Under this analysis, a court first would need to determine whether 
the original work is indeed copyrightable.  Because the photographs taken 
for “New Portraits” were artistic, original works, it is very likely they 
would merit copyright protection.  Then, copyright owners likely would 
claim infringement on their exclusive right to make copies of their work 
and the exclusive right to publicly display their work.  In response to such 
claims, Prince most likely would raise a fair use defense. 
The court would then turn to the four-factor analysis.  In considering the 
first factor and analyzing the transformation of the secondary work, the 
court would examine what elements of the underlying work were changed.  
Prince’s extremely minimal content transformation in “New Portraits” 
would weigh heavily against a finding of fair use.  In terms of content, 
Prince added only a single comment under the Instagram photo.  Under the 
proposed interpretation of the first statutory factor, this minor change would 
not be enough.  Additionally, because a court would not consider the 
transformation of purpose or the transformation of the context of the works, 
Prince would be relying solely on his one added element in this part of the 
consideration. 
The second factor, the nature and content of the copyrighted work, also 
would weigh against a finding of fair use.  This factor looks to the nature of 
the original work—here, creative and artistic Instagram pictures.  Their 
publication on social media should not detract from the amount of 
protection they receive. 
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion taken likely 
would be considered neutral to this analysis.  It would be difficult to use a 
photograph in a secondary work without the whole image.  However, it still 
should be considered that Prince took entireties of works and not merely 
elements from them. 
The fourth factor, the effect on the market, will weigh most heavily 
against a finding of fair use for this case.  Because this factor is elevated in 
this amended analysis, the fact that Prince monetized others’ work for huge 
financial gain is of central importance.  A court also should note that the 
digital content creators put their work up for free, and if anyone has the 
right to monetize that work without sufficient transformation, it is the 
creators. 
Finally, this Note’s amended analysis also posits that a court should 
consider the direction of the appropriation in its fair use determination.  
Because “New Portraits” appropriated material from amateur artists for a 
professional artist’s gain, this weighs strongly against a finding of fair use.  
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As such, this amended interpretation of the four statutory fair use factors 
would protect first-order digital content creators, such as the Instagram 
users in “New Portraits,” from professional appropriators like Richard 
Prince. 
F.  Critiques and Responses 
Several potential critiques arise from this proposed amended 
interpretation.  The two main critiques include:  (1) the overruling of 
precedent and (2) the difficult factual determination between amateur and 
professional users. 
1.  Overruling Precedent:  Changing What Constitutes 
a Transformative Use 
One potential critique to the new interpretations suggested by this Note is 
that implementing this system will require overruling current precedent.194  
Primarily, implementation of this Note’s proposal, that courts should 
require a transformation of content rather than a transformation of context, 
changes the current precedent in both the Second and Ninth Circuits.195 
However, a limitation that would alleviate this concern is that courts need 
only apply these considerations to digital appropriation art cases.  While 
there are parallels to other areas of copyright and appropriation art, the ease 
of digital dissemination and copying is the tension this proposed system 
aims to address.  Still, applying the amended statutory factors to other 
appropriation art cases would not engender a negative result.  For instance, 
if this proposed interpretation had been applied to the case of Cariou, the 
court would have considered more heavily the monetary gain of Prince at 
Cariou’s expense.  While the Second Circuit might still have found that 
Prince “transformed” the underlying content to a sufficient degree, it would 
have considered the fact that the art was reproduced on a larger scale or that 
it was intended for a different audience.196 
Forcing a more substantial transformation also reflects the utilitarian 
nature of Copyright Clause:  that copyright protection is afforded to 
encourage and promote the creation of new artistic works.  Fair use still 
would have a place but would have a higher bar.  Indeed, Professor Gervais 
notes that before the most recent fair use cases, “transformativeness focused 
on changes to the work, including a creative recontextualization, but not a 
mere modification in its mode of dissemination.”197  So in fact, this analysis 
seems to only be reaffirming the traditional interpretation of this first 
statutory factor. 
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2.  The Factual Determination Between 
Amateur and Professional 
While this could be a difficult determination, in most cases it likely 
would be clear if one user is a professional and another is an amateur.  It 
might be clear based on age, reputation, or career stage.  Courts make fact-
specific determinations in many contexts, and this determination would not 
be so different than deciding whether someone is an employee or 
independent contractor for purposes of tort or corporate law.  As with other 
determinations, a multifactored analysis should be used to draw the line 
between amateurs and professionals in this context. 
Courts should look to the user’s education, artistic portfolio, community 
reputation, history of sales, and age as a set of nonexclusive factors to 
categorize artists for this analysis.  Art education in itself might lend toward 
a finding of professionalism.  However, if an artist was still in school or 
recently graduated, that would lend itself toward a categorization of 
amateur.  An artistic portfolio would evidence what type of work the artist 
usually does and in what context.  Similarly, the community reputation and 
history of sales would look to the artist’s place and standing in the 
community and the regard of their peers. 
Adding this judicial analysis is yet another decision for a judge to make.  
However, its relative ease, combined with the implications this Note 
discussed above, make it worth any additional time spent. 
CONCLUSION 
Social media is such a new phenomenon that the law has not been 
adequately able to address the rights and liabilities for both creators and 
users of copyrighted works in its context.  Should participating on social 
media mean risking or forfeiting traditional copyright protections?  Or can 
we amend the fair use considerations to allow for productive uses of 
copyrighted works while also protecting the original content creator?  The 
answer to the latter question is yes.  To propose otherwise would be 
denying an entire generation, which largely posts works digitally, copyright 
protection that has long been a societal driver of creativity and expression.  
In amending the weight given to the statutory fair use factors, the rights of 
first-order digital content creators will be more protected and will continue 
to encourage contribution to our artistic culture. 
